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THE APPLICATION OF QUANTUM MERUIT TO ATTORNEY FEE
LITIGATION*
Ratio legis est anima legis. The reason of the law is the soul
of the law
In recent years, cases involving attorney fees have accounted for a
large percentage of the Louisiana jurisprudence concerning quantum
meruit. If the reason of the law is the soul of the law, then it may be
said that several Louisiana courts have robbed the law of its soul, for
they have applied quantum meruit in these cases indiscriminately, relying
blindly upon questionable statements of law in past decisions.
Since quantum meruit first appeared early in Louisiana jurispru-
dence,' the exact scope of the theory as used by the Louisiana courts
has been unclear One clear aspect of quantum meruit, its common law
origin, has remained largely unmentioned by the courts. 2 The theory
can legitimately claim no foundation in the Civil Code. Consequently,
quantum meruit is a concept alien to the civil law tradition. Nevertheless,
the Louisiana judiciary has adopted the doctrine as its own.
This paper discusses the application of quantum meruit to claims
for attorney fees in Louisiana courts,' concentrating particularly on
contemporary jurisprudence. The paper begins by identifying those fac-
tors that courts, after deciding to apply quantum meruit, examine in
order to determine the monetary recovery of attorneys. Then, several
fact situations in which the courts commonly apply quantum meruit are
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* The author wishes to acknowledge that this paper was written for a course in
Quasi Contracts taught by Professor Alain A. Levasseur.
1. In Gilley v. Henry, 8 Mart. (o.s.) 402 (La. 1820), the court applied the general
concept in the form of quantum valebant, which concerns the value of goods. Quantum
meruit, on the other hand, pertains to the value of services. See also Dunbar v. Butler,
2 Rob. 32 (La. 1845) and Dauenhauer v Succession of Browne, 47 La. Ann. 341, 16
So. 827 (1895) for early Louisiana applications of quantum meruit.
2. See, however, Oil Purchasers, Inc. v Kuehling, 334 So. 2d 420 (La. 1976), in
which the Louisiana Supreme Court described quantum meruit as a " 'striking example
of an ill-considered importation from the common law. " Id. at 425 (quoting Comment,
Quantum Meruit in Louisiana, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 631 (1976)). Still, this criticism of the
concept has apparently had little effect on the appellate courts.
3. For more general discussions of the Louisiana concept of quantum meruit, see
Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in Civil Law and Louisiana Law, 37 Tul. L. Rev 49
(1962); Comment, Quantum Meruit in Louisiana, 50 Tul. L. Rev 631 (1976); Note,
Obligations-Quantum Meruit, 18 La. L. Rev. 209 (1957); Note, Obligations-Quasi
Contracts-Art. 2293, 24 Tul. L. Rev 141 (1949).
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discussed. The approaches that courts have taken to these situations are
analyzed and criticized, and recommendations are offered In an attempt
to return the jurisprudence surrounding attorney fees to its civilian rootS.
I. DETERMINING ATTORNtY FEES, ON A QUANTUM MERUIT BAsis
Setting aside for the moment the issue of -whether quantim meruit
applies to the particular situation at .all, this section discusses the courts'
method of determining the fee after it has-been determined that quantum
meruit applies. Courts awarding compensation to an attorney .under a
quantum meruit theory have proceeded in a f61rly consistent manner
Quantum meruit recovery has been based on the standard of rea-
sonable remuneration fot the attorney's services, as determined by ex-
amination of several aspects of the attorney's performance. Since the
Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Saucier v'- Hayes Dairy Products,4
courts have most, commonly applied -factors set out in the Code of
Professional. Responsibility' to deterthine;'quanturn meruit recovery by
an attorney 6 Before Saucier, the predominant view was that the rules
of ethics applied only in disciplinary proceedings against attorneys. The
Saucier court, pursuant, tO Its constitutional giant Of power to prescribe
rules regulating the practice of IAw, 7 injected ,.the ethical rules with
unprecedented authority by deeming t"hh substantive la#- 8 The. rules
identified by the court prescribed standards fdr determining the. reason-
ableness of attorneys' fees. Therefofe, subsequ6ent courts reasoned, in
accordance with the Code of Professional ,Responsibility) the following
factors are to be examined to determine, the amount of an attorney's
recovery in quantum meruit:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of
the questions involved, and the skill requisite -to perform the
legal service properly
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the clierit, that the acceptance
of the particular employment will preclude otter ..employment
by the lawyer J "
(3) The fee customarily charged in the lo~ality for sinilar legal
services..
(4) The amount. involved and .the results 'obtained.
4. 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979) (on rehearing).
5. Model Code of Ptofesslotial Respongibility DR 2-106 (192).
6. See, e.g., Fowler v. Jordan, 430 So. 2d 711, 7'15 (La. App. 2d Cit. 1983): "The
determination of an attorney's legal compensation dnder,,a quantum merust analysis i's
predicated upon an evaluation of the facts in the'record and an application of the criteria
listed in Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
7 La. Const. art. V § 5(A).
8. Saucier 373 So. 2d at 115.
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(5) The time limations imposed by the client or by the tir-
cumstances.
<6) Tl* nature avid length of the professional relationship with
the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or
lawyers 1efformin* the services.
(8) Whethet thq fee is fixed of contingent 9
Even before the Saucikr decision, some courts were usihg several of
these factors to determhine the amount of quantum meruit recovery by
an attorney.' 0
In addition to the factors listed by the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, otler" factor have been considered by sOme coutts in deter-
mining the amount of' quantum meruit recovery owed to an attorney.
For instance, ifh Liles v, Bourgeois," the court provided a fiSt resembling
an abbreviated version of the Code's factors:
(1) Relpolsibility' incurred.
(2) Externt nd character ,.of labor performed.
(3) Importate of questi.on presented.(4) fiih'hOiO.
(5). KnowlWle antl ability of counsel.12
lfi another case,. Oarett Hill Land Corp. v. Succession'Of Cdinbre,l3
the Louisiana Supt~eme Court considered the following fators in de-
-termining'the reaonablentst of a contingency fee contract.' the' risk of
nonrecovery; the almount of legal *biok performed; the size df the estate
involved in the. sticcersiont- proceeding; and the anticilalted, d-lay in
receiving the fee. " OtHer. coflrts have even considered the ability of the
party to pay the' fee Is" ind the general economic conditions, prevailing
at tile titne the' sarvices are rendered as factors in deteftmining the
teasonableness. Of the, fee."
9. Model o de of Prbfessl6ial Resp0ns.bility DR 2-106 (1982). It must be noted
that 'the Louisiana Supremo Court recently $doptod the Model Rules of Profesfi6nal
Cbnduct (1983)-to replace' th Code of Professiorfal Responibility. the fadors listed in
Model Rule 1.5(a), ho64 , Sre substantially identical to those quoted above from the
earlier Code.
10. See, e.g.; Succession 9t Butler, 294 So. 2d 512 (La. 1974); 'In re Interstate Trust
& Banking Co., 235 La. 825, 106 So. 2d 276 (1958) (on rehearifig); Henriques v. Vaccaro,
218 La. 1020, 51 Sd. 2d 611 (1951); Sokbl v. Bob McKinnon Chevrolet, 307 8o. 2d 404
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); La*rd,', v. Burglass, 286 So. 2d 170 (La. App. 4th' Cir. 1973).
11. 517 So. 2d '107g (L. App" 3d Cir. 1987).
12. Id. at 172.
13. 306 So. 2d 118 (La. 1975).
14. Id. at 723.
15. Henriques v. Vaccaro,.218 La. 102G, 51 So,. 2d 611 (1951); Nunez v. Ricks, 262
So. 2d 585 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 262 La. 1091, 266 So. 2d 221 (1972).
16. Henriques, 51 So. 2d at 611.
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Although the method of calculating an attorney's recovery under
quantum meruit is important, the subject does not lend itself readily to
in-depth reasoned analysis. The trial courts have been afforded much
discretion in setting monetary recovery in quantum meruit. 17 The second
circuit, after a detailed discussion of quantum meruit, concluded
"[q]uantum meruit analysis cannot be reduced to the mere application
of mathematical formulas; it involves, instead, a complex calculus of
the many factors delineated above, and is sensitive to the unique facts
of each case."'" Therefore, aside from listing basically the same abstract
factors to consider with only occasional minor variations, no two courts
figure recovery under quantum meruit in exactly the same manner.
•II. JURISPRUDENTIAL APPLICATION OF QUANTUM MERUIT
The most important question in the area of quantum meruit does
not concern the actual manner of calculating the attorney fees, but
rather, the appropriate circumstances, if any, for the application of
quantum meruit. When should the quantum meruit theory be used? This
is the greatest area of inconsistency and lack of reason among the
courts.
Whether quantum meruit will be applied in a particular case depends
to a large extent upon a number of factors. A very significant factor
is whether the attorney has been discharged before completing all or
substantially all of his obligations under the contract. Also relevant is
the nature of the compensation, if any, to which the parties have agreed:
Was there an agreement for an hourly retainer, a contingency fee, or
a flat fee? Finally, whether the client hired a new attorney after dis-
charging the first also influences the determination.
How these various factors are combined in a particular case will
determine the court's choice of the basis for the attorney's recovery. In
the sections below, the approaches that Louisiana courts have taken to
several common fact situations, each of which represents a particular
combination of these factors, will be considered.
A. Absence of Compensation Provision
Attorneys occasionally perform services notwithstanding the absence
of an express agreement between the client and attorney about com-
pensation. The Louisiana decisions addressing this issue appear to adopt
one of two lines of thought.
17. See, e.g., Succession of Butler, 294 So. 2d 512 (La. 1974); Liles v. Bourgeois,
517 So. 2d 1078 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Oppenheim v. Bouterie, 505 So. 2d 100 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1987).
18. Fowler v. Jordan, 430 So. 2d 711, 718 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
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Nugent v. Downs 9 exemplifies the first approach. In Nugent, an
attorney agreed to represent his aunt in filing a personal injury action.
After reaching a settlement, he sent his aunt a bill for 30% of that
amount, contending that there had been an oral agreement for the
attorney to collect a fee of one-third of the recovery. The aunt refused
to pay, arguing that no such agreement as to compensation had been
reached, and that she expected to pay her nephew nothing. At trial,
the judge accepted the attorney's version of the facts, finding that " 'the
preponderance of the evidence establishes a contract.' "20 On appeal,
the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal stated:
We cannot say that the trial judge erred in finding that a
contract of employment was entered into between Nugent and
Mrs. Downs, as contended by plaintiff. The evidence convinces
us, however, that in any event plaintiff is entitled to recover
the full amount claimed as attorney's fees and expenses on
quantum meruit and we thus prefer to base our decision on
that ground. 2'
Justifying this approach, the court stated that where no express contract
fixes an attorney's fee, "he is entitled to remuneration for services
rendered on quantum meruit." ' 22 The court then figured recovery under
quantum meruit, using factors very similar to those listed by the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
2
In other cases, courts have employed similar approaches in the
absence of express provision for attorney fees. 24 It should be noted that
in none of these cases did the client contend that he did not authorize
the attorney to act on his behalf or that no contract at all had been




23. Id. See supra text accompanying note 9. Paradoxically, after stating its preference
for quantum meruit over contract, the court found that 3007o of the recovery, the amount
billed by the attorney under the contract, was a "fair and reasonable fee" and affirmed
the trial court's award of that amount.
24. In Robinson v. Bethay, 338 So. 2d 969, 971 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976), the court
wrote: "While it would have been better practice had [the attorney] arrived at a clear
fee agreement before undertaking the defense, this does not preclude his recovery under
a quantum meruit theory." Similarly, in Pittman & Matheyn v. Davidge, 189 So. 2d 706,
709 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 249 La. 768, 191 So. 2d 143 (1966), the court
stated: "It is settled law that where there is no express contract fixing his fee, an attorney-
at-law is entitled to remuneration for services rendered on quantum meruit." Other cases
calling for quantum meruit recovery in this situation include Simon, Corne & Block v.
Duke, 429 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 437 So. 2d 1147 (1983); Henriques
v. Vaccaro, 218 La. 1020, 51 So. 2d 611 (1951); Jackson v. New Orleans Bd. of Trade,
207 La. 571, 21 So. 2d 731 (1945).
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reached. Except as to compensation, some agreement did exist between
the attorney and client in each of these cases.
Schaff v. Landers25 represents the second line of jurisprudential
thought in situations where there is no express fee provision. Quoting
article 1816 of the Civil Code of 1870,26 the court held that "[w]hen
one employs a lawyer for professional services and the amount or
measure of the lawyer's fees is not expressly agreed upon, there is a
contract, including an implied promise to pay the lawyer 'the value' of
those services. "27 Thus the court upheld the contract, merely implying
an intent to agree on a reasonable fee in the absence of any express
provision therefor. Although this approach appears to occupy the mi-
nority position, there are at least two other cases in which courts
apparently preferred to imply an intention for a reasonable fee rather
than to rely upon quantum meruit. 28
Another noteworthy case, Brewer v. Scullin,29 exhibits a confused
mixing of these two approaches. The court first stated: "In a suit on
a professional services contract for collection of a note, when there is
no agreement as to a fee, the parties are presumed to have intended a
reasonable fee." 30 By this statement, the court appeared to concur with
the second line of thought identified above, recognizing the contract
and implying an intent for a reasonable fee in the absence of a fee
provision. Later in the same decision, however, the court stated: "A
suit for attorney's fees under a services contract, in which the parties
failed to specify the amount of the fee, has been regarded as a suit for
breach of a quasi-contract . ". .. " The Brewer court, therefore, appears
to have adopted both of the lines of thought discussed previously.
By straddling the fence between the implied contractual and the
quasi contractual approaches, the Brewer court unintentionally illustrates
a point that must be noted. The two approaches stand in sharp contrast
theoretically. The first relies on quantum meruit to resolve a matter that
the contract did not provide for, namely, compensation. The theory
underlying this approach is essentially noncontractual. The second works
25. 355 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
26. That article, now repealed, stated in part:
Actions without words, either written or spoken, are presumptive evidence of
a contract, when they are done under circumstances that naturally imply a
consent to such contract. To receive goods from a merchant without any express
promise, and to use them, implies a promise to pay the value.
27. Schaff, 355 So. 2d at 290.
-28. Reynolds, Nelson, Theriot & Stahl v. Chatelain, 428 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 5th
Cir.), writ denied, 434 So. 2d 1098 (1983); Succession of D'Antoni, 430 So. 2d 1111 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1983).
29. 353 So. 2d 386 (La. App. 4th Cir, 1977).
30. Id. at 387.
31. Id. at 388 (citing Succession of Butler, 294 So. 2d 512 (La. 1974)).
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within the framework of the contract by supplying the missing term-
a provision for a reasonable fee-based on the assumption that the
parties implicitly agreed to (or intended) such a provision. On a more
practical level, however, the difference between the two lines of thought
becomes less apparent. Both approaches ultimately result in judicial
determination of a reasonable fee. For this reason, courts such as the
Brewer court can confusedly use the approaches interchangeably to reach
the same result and never realize the inconsistency. Nevertheless, purity
of theory remains a worthy and desirable goal.
Because it is consistent with the civilian tradition, the approach
taken by Judge Redmann in Schaff v. Landers deserves praise. Rather
than use the ill-defined jurisprudential concept of quantum meruit, that
court preferred to base its decision on a much more solid foundation,
the Civil Code. However, that court, as well as the others mentioned
in this section, should also have cited the second sentence of then-
existing article 196532 as authority for the implication of intent to agree
on a reasonable fee.
When contemporary courts encounter cases in which no express fee
provision exists, they should use new article 2054. 31 Article 2054 seems
to be addressed to the exact situation outlined earlier:
When the parties made no provision for a particular situ-
ation, it must be assumed that they intended to bind themselves
not only to the express provisions of the contract, but also to
whatever the law, equity, or usage regards as implied in a
contract of that kind or necessary for the contract to achieve
its purpose.3 4
As a drafter's comment points out, article 2054 provides for the instance
where the contract "simply fails to address a particular question." '35
Thus, where no express compensation provision is supplied in an oth-
erwise valid contract, the court should assume, pursuant to article 2054,
that the attorney and client intended to bind themselves to a reasonable
32. La. Civ. Code art. 1965 (1870) provided:
The equity intended by this rule is founded in the Christian principle not to
do unto others that which we would not wish others should do unto us; and
on the moral maxim of the law that no one ought to enrich himself at the
expense of another. When the law of the land, and that which the parties have
made for themselves by their contract, are silent, courts must apply these
principles to determine what ought to be incidents to a contract, which are
required by equity.
33. La. Civ. Code art. 2054. See also La. Civ. Code art. 21 (1870) and La. Civ.
Code art. 4.
34. La. Civ. Code art. 2054.
35. Id. comment (b).
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fee agreement. Quantum meruit should be rejected where the Code
applies.
B. Discharge from an Hourly Fee Agreement
As was noted earlier, another common situation is that in which
an attorney is discharged by a client with whom an hourly fee agreement
had been reached. Among the Louisiana courts that have addressed this
situation, there has been no agreement regarding the applicability of
quantum meruit.
The majority rule is that an attorney who has been dismissed by
his client is entitled to reimbursement for his services on a quantum
meruit basis only, regardless of the character of his fee arrangement. 36
This rule is based on the idea that upon discharge, the contract between
the attorney and client is dissolved and terminated, thus rendering the
compensation provision of that contract unenforceable. 37
In the recent case of Lester v. Lester,3" the court took a different
tack. In that case, the client had paid a $4,000 retainer and had agreed
by written contract to pay the attorney an hourly fee of $120 for
representing him in separation proceedings. Prior to partition of the
community, the firm was discharged. The Lester court took note of the
cases involving contingency and fixed fee contracts in which the courts
had held that quantum meruit provides the proper basis for recovery
when an attorney is discharged. 9 The court distinguished those cases,
however, stating that
[t]he rationale of those cases does not serve, however, to permit
a client who has agreed to pay an hourly fee, and on whose
behalf services have been performed pursuant to that agreement,
to ignore statements for those services, discharge the attorney,
and avoid contractual fee obligations theretofore incurred. As
to services rendered in accordance with the parties' agreement
the contractual fee provision is enforceable .... 40
Thus, under the rational of the Lester decision, the compensation pro-
visions of the contract are not rendered unenforceable by the client's
36. Krampe v. Krampe, 510 So. 2d 1289 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 513 So.
2d 824 (1987); Sims v. Selvage, 499 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986); Fowler v.
Jordan, 430 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Simon v. Metoyer, 383 So. 2d 1321
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 389 So. 2d 1338 (1980).
37. Krampe, 510 So. 2d at 1293; Fowler, 430 So. 2d at 715; Simon, 383 So. 2d at
1324; Smith v. Westside Transit Lines, 313 So. 2d 371, 375 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 318 So. 2d 43 (1975).
38. 516 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
39. Id. at 221 (discussing Fowler, 430 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983) and Simon,
383 So. 2d 1321 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980)).
40. Lester, 516 So. 2d at 221.
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discharge of the attorney. The attorney is to be paid on the basis of
the hourly charges agreed to by the client for work done by the attorney
up to the time of discharge.
The Lester case represents the correct approach to determining the
fee to which an attorney who has been discharged from an hourly fee
agreement is entitled. Although not cited as its primary authority, Civil
Code article 201941 formed part of the basis for the court's determination
that the attorney should receive compensation in accordance with the
agreed hourly fee up to the point of discharge. That article provides:
In contracts providing for continuous or periodic perform-
ance, the effect of the dissolution shall not be extended to any
performance already rendered. 42
The Lester court apparently reasoned that the attorney's services are
rendered pursuant to a contract for "periodic performance." Thus, the
effect of the attorney's discharge and the resulting dissolution of the
contract should not extend to those services already rendered by the
attorney.
Besides having support in codal authority, the use of the hourly fee
agreement to provide compensation to the discharged attorney is surely
more reasonable than the use of quantum meruit. Awarding the hourly
fee represents the will of the parties more accurately and enforces their
intention more correctly than the vague notion of quantum meruit,
which allows the court to substitute its will for that of the parties. Thus,
in this situation also, quantum meruit should be rejected in favor of
the Civil Code provisions.
C. Discharge from a Contingency Fee Agreement
Unique problems arise when a client discharges an attorney with
whom a contingency fee agreement has been reached. Because of the
nature of contingency fee agreements, the jurisprudence addressing this
situation appears to be in a constant state of confusion and flux. Since
an attempt to set out exhaustively every variation in the approaches that
have been taken and the results that have been reached by the courts
would require a separate paper in itself, only four illustrative decisions
will be addressed in this section.
Each of these decisions displays the same basic fact situation. Typ-
ically an agreement between the client (Client) and his attorney (Attorney
1) is reached to the effect that Attorney I is to be compensated by a
certain percentage of any funds recovered on behalf of Client. After
Attorney 1 performs some services toward this end, Client discharges




him and reaches a similar agreement with a new attorney (Attorney 2).
Thereafter, some recovery is made on behalf. of *Client, through either
settlement or trial. The issue for the.courts' resolution is usually presented
in the context of the proper compensation, if any, for Attorney. I Even
in this restricted fact situation, broad consensu is ngnexistent.
The latest pronouncement from the Louisiana Supreme Court on
this issue is found in Saucier v Hayes Dairy Products.43 Presented with
this fact situation, the trial court limited Attorney l's recovery to quan-
tum meruit, awarding him $3,000. 44 The court of appeal, finding that
Attorney 1 h~d been dismissed "without cause," enforced the contin-
gency fee agreement, increasing the award to $25,Q00, equal to the
agreed upoa .33%o of the recovery 4 In its original opinion, the supreme
court affirmed. 46 As noted by the dissents to the original opinion, this
decision effectively divided Client's gross recovery of $75,000 three ways:
Client, Attorney 1, and Attorney 2 each was to receive one-third of the
amount of recovery 47
Prompted by a change in composition of the court's membership,
the supreme court reheard the case and concluded diffsrently 41 On
rehearing the court focused on the ethicaf rules, contained in the Code
of Professional Responsibility The court concentrated' particularly on
those rules dictating that a lawyer shall not collect an unfeasonable fee49
and that a lawyer shall withdraw from employment when discharged by
the client.5 0 The court stated that these ethical rules 'have. the force and
effect of substantive law," thus dramatically extending their use beyond
disciplinary proceedings.. The court then reasoned that the rule requiring
withdrawal upon discharge "is stripped of effect if the client's exercise
of that right is conditioned upon his payment of the full amount specified
in the contract." 5 2 Furthermore, the limitation of the attorney's, com-
pensation to a reasonable fee is violated by "permitting a lawyer to
reap in full measure the contracted-for fee provided in a contingency
fee contract without providing all or substantially 411 of the legal services
contemplated by the contract."" The court concluded that "only one
contingency fee should be paid by the client,, tile amount of the fee to
43. 373 So. 2d 102, 114 (La. 1979) (on reheanng).
44. Id. at 104.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 106.
47 Id. at 108 (Dennis, Tate, and Calogero, JJ., dissenting).
48. The majority~opinion on rehearing, which begins id. at 114, was written by Justice
Calogero.
49. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106 (1982).
5,0. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-110 (1982).
51. Saucter 373 So. 2d at 115 (on rehearing).




be determined according to the highest ethical contingency percentage
to which the client contractually agreed in any of the contingency fee
contracts which he executed." '5 4 That fee is to be "allocated between
or among the various attorneys involved in handling the claim in ques-
tion, such fee apportionment to be on the basis of factors which are
set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility."" Client, in effect,
was required to pay only one total contingent fee, and both Attorney
1 and Attorney 2 were required to litigate the allocation of that fee on
remand to the trial court.5 6 Notably, the court explicitly rejected quantum
meruit in this situation: "The amount prescribed in the contingency fee
contract, not quantum meruit, is the proper frame of reference for fixing
compensation for the attorney prematurely discharged without cause.""
Apparently the only court that has strictly followed the Saucier
decision's lead has been the court that rendered the decision, the supreme
court." However, one court seems to have reached the same result prior
to Saucier, although by a different theoretical route. Smith v. Westside
Transit Lines59 involved the same basic fact situation set out above.
Client, after discharging Attorney 1, settled the case for $25,000 with
the help of Attorney 2. Attorney 1 claimed that he should be awarded
the agreed-upon contingency fee (one-third of the recovery) or alter-
natively that he should receive the sum of $11,650 on the basis of
quantum meruit (computed at $50 per hour for 233 hours of work).
The trial court concluded that Attorney 1 was entitled to recover on a
quantum meruit basis and found that a fee of $2,400 "would do
substantial justice."' 6 The appellate court agreed that Attorney l's re-
covery was to be rendered on a quantum meruit basis, 6' but noted the
"absurdity" of basing a quantum meruit recovery in a contingeny fee
situation strictly on the hours spent by the attorney on the case. 62 In
this situation, Attorney I would have recovered far more than the amount
he contracted for if his recovery would have been based on the number
of hours worked. Instead, the court devised this mechanism:
54. Id. at 118.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 119.
57. Id. at 118. Despite this clear rejection of quantum meruit, at least one court has
misinterpreted the Saucier decision as requiring the application of that theory. Defrancesch
v. Hardin, 510 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 513 So. 2d 819 (1987). See
also infra text accompanying notes 99-108, discussing how some courts have confused the
figuring of quantum meruit recovery with the determination of reasonable fees under the
ethical rules.
58. Scott v. Kemper Ins. Co., 377 So. 2d 66 (La. 1979).
59. 313 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 318 So. 2d 43 (1975).
60. Id. at 373.
61. Id. at 376.
62. Id. at 378.
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In order for a proper quantum meruit fee to be arrived at for
appellant there should be an evidentiary hearing in which the
court should take the testimony of both attorneys, evaluate the
quality and effectiveness of the services performed by each,
allocate a percentage of the total to appellant and fix his fee
based on that percentage of the maximum he could have re-
covered in this case . *63
The allocation ordered by the court called for an evaluation of the
quality of each attorney's work and the effect that each attorney's work
had on the ultimate settlement of the case. In this manner, the court
required an apportionment of the one fee between Attorney 1 and
Attorney 2.
As was stated before, the result of the Smith approach was very
similar to that of the Saucier approach. Both approaches call for the
payment by the client of only one contingency fee, that fee to be allocated
between the two attorneys proportionately to their services. The theo-
retical underpinnings of the two approaches, however, are nominally
very different. The Smith court relied on quantum meruit. Rejecting
the jurisprudential theory of quantum meruit, the Saucier court based
its decision instead on substantive positive law, the Code of Professional
Responsibility."
A recent case, Krampe v. Krampe,65 notes and distinguishes the
Saucier approach. In that case, Attorney 1 and Client had agreed upon
compensation of "40% of recovery."" Client was offered a settlement
of $350,000, but Attorney I refused to consent to the settlement. 67 After
this refusal, Client discharged Attorney 1 and employed Attorney 2 to
accept the settlement offer.
The Krampe court first stated what it termed the "long established
general rule" 6 that "a discharged attorney must seek compensation on
63. Id.
64. This statement accepts for the moment the questionable propriety of elevating
the judicially-adopted ethical rules to the status of substantive law. For purposes of this
discussion, it is relevant only that the Saucier court based its decision on what it considered
to be positive, substantive law instead of on quantum meruit.
65. 510 So. 2d 1289 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 513 So. 2d 824 (1987).
66. Id. at 1290.
67. The attorney argued that he had a proprietary interest in the client's claim by
virtue of La. R.S. 37:218 (1988), which, on its face, permits an attorney to prohibit his
client by contract from settling or otherwise disposing of a suit without his consent. In-
depth discussion of this provision is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, suffice
it to say that the jurisprudence has held that the interest acquired by an attorney under
R.S. 37:218 (1988) is a privilege, rather than an ownership right, to the extent of the
fee earned. See Saucier v. Hayes, 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979); Calk v. Highland Constr.
& Mfg., 376 So. 2d 495 (La. 1979); Krampe, 510 So. 2d 1289 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987);
Kinsey v. Dixon, 467 So. 2d 862 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
68. Krampe, 510 So. 2d at 1292.
[Vol. 49
COMMENTS
a quantum meruit basis regardless of whether the fee arrangement called
for a contingency fee or a fixed fee paid in advance by means of a
promissory note." ' 69 This rule is based on the idea that an employment
agreement between attorney and client is a contract of mandate.7 ° For
this reason, Client, who is the principal, may revoke the contract at
will,7 1 thereby terminating and dissolving the entire attorney-client con-
tract. 72 The general rule of requiring quantum meruit in this situation,
then, is based on the idea that no contract for compensation exists upon
discharge and therefore that recovery must be based on some other
cause of action. Quantum meruit has been used to fill the void."
After stating this "general rule," the Krampe court then recognized
the Saucier "departure" from this rule, which required the recognition
of the contingency fee contract instead of quantum meruit as the proper
frame of reference. 74 Next, however, the court attempted to distinguish
Saucier on its facts, stating that the basis of Saucier was "to prevent
a client from reaping any possible unfair advantage resulting from the
discharge of his attorney." 7 The Krampe court ruled that here, the
client had reaped no unfair advantage because she had been required
to hire another attorney. 76 The Krampe court failed to recognize, how-
ever, that a second attorney had also been hired in Saucier. The court's
failed attempt at factual distinction reflects a thinly disguised desire to
apply the more jurisprudentially accepted theory of quantum meruit
rather than the approach of the Saucier court.
The court eventually concluded: "Once a client has exercised the
right to terminate the contract of employment . . . the fee provisions
of the contract become unenforceable, and the attorney's only claim is
in quantum meruit, subject to judicial review of reasonableness. ' 77 Yet,
paradoxically, after briefly discussing the trial court's award on a quan-
69. Id.
70. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2985-3034.
71. La. Civ. Code art. 3028.
72. Krampe, 510 So. 2d at 1292; Fowler v. Jordan, 430 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1983); Simon v. Metoyer, 383 So. 2d 1321 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 389 So.
2d 1338 (1980).
73. As was noted by the court in Broussard, Broussard & Moresi v. State Auto &
Casualty Underwriters Co., 287 So. 2d 544, 548 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 290
So. 2d 908 (1974), "if a distinction exists between the necessary elements of a cause of
action in quantum meruit and one in quasi contract, this distinction has long been clouded
by repeated interchangeable references to both theories when describing a set of operative
facts which constitute a cause of action."
74. Krampe, 510 So. 2d at 1292.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1293 (citing Simon, Corne & Block v. Duke, 429 So. 2d 507 (La. App.
3d Cir.), writ denied, 437 So. 2d 1147 (1983)).
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turn meruit basis, the Krampe court affirmed that award, which was
equal to the amount agreed upon in the contingency agreement. 78 Thus,
definitive analysis of the Krampe court's theoretical approach becomes
difficult, if not impossible. Did the court genuinely apply quantum meruit
principles, or did it only nominally rely on quantum meruit (which in
these cases is based on the absence of a contract) and in fact simply
enforce the contingency fee contract?
The end result of the Krampe case was that Attorney 1 was com-
pensated, as contemplated by the contingency fee agreement, with 40%
of the recovery, even though Client had been forced to retain another
attorney in order to attain the settlement. The court failed to state what
payment Attorney 2 received as compensation for her services, but it
was certainly over and above the amount of the original contingency
contract. This fact distinguishes the result in Krampe from the result
in the Saucier and Smith cases.
The case of Sims v. Selvage 9 presents yet another approach to the
same basic fact situation. The court first stated the same "general rule"
set out by the Krampe court, that the dismissed attorney can recover
only on the basis of quantum meruit.80 Quoting from Saucier, the court
then stated that "the fee should be apportioned between the attorneys
'according to the respective services and contributions for the attorneys
for work performed and other relevant factors.' "81 The court thus mixed
quantum meruit with the Saucier approach, which required apportion-
ment of the agreed contingency fee and explicitly rejected quantum
meruit.
As can be seen from the Smith, Krampe, and Sims cases, quantum
meruit apparently is the nominal approach used by the majority of
courts that have addressed this fact situation. However, very little uni-
formity exists in the application of that concept.
What should the courts do? The issue of proper compensation is
more difficult to resolve in the case of a contingency fee agreement
than in the case of an hourly fee agreement, where the agreed hourly
fee can be readily identified as the most logical basis of recovery. Surely
it would be unfair to the client if both contingency fee contracts were
enforced, with the result that the client would effectively be required
to pay two full contingency fees. Furthermore, as the Saucier court
observed, this approach would emasculate the rule allowing termination
of an attorney whenever the client desires. What client will discharge
an attorney when faced with the threat of paying two full attorney fees?
78. Krampe, 510 So. 2d at 1293.
79. 499 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
80. Id. at 329.
81. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Hayes, 373 So. 2d 102, 118 (La. 1979) (on rehearing)).
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The result reached in the Saucier case on rehearing appears to be
the most reasonable. The client should only be required to pay one
contingency fee in return for obtaining the result contemplated by the
agreement. Payment of that contingency fee, rather than some different
fee decided on the basis of quantum meruit, more accurately reflects
the will, intentions, and expectations of both parties at the time of
agreement that the attorney will seek the desired result. Furthermore,
as the Saucier court held, this one fee should be divided among the
two attorneys in the only practical manner: the character and results of
each attorney's services should determine the allocation and should be
an issue of fact for the court.
The approach of the Saucier court on rehearing is also superior
from the standpoint of theory. The Saucier court admirably preferred
to rely on what it considered substantive positive law, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, instead of quantum meruit. However, the
court should have chosen to ground its decision in the provisions of
the Civil Code. At the time, Civil Code article 196582 provided:
The equity intended by this rule is founded ... on the
moral maxim of the law that no one ought to enrich himself
at the expense of another. When the law[s] [that] . . . the parties
have made for themselves by their contract, are silent, courts
must apply these principles to determine what ought to be in-
cidents to a contract, which are required by equity.
The court could have used the rules contained in this article to reach
the same equitable result and thereby avoided having to elevate the
ethical rules to the status of substantive law.
Courts facing this situation in the future should apply the second
paragraph of article 2018.83 That passage provides:
If partial performance has been rendered and that perform-
ance is of value to the party seeking to dissolve the contract,
the dissolution does not preclude recovery for that performance,
whether in contract or quasi-contract.84
Thus, recovery for the attorney's services, which were probably of some
value to the client, is not precluded by the employment contract's
dissolution. Because that is so, a court could use article 2018 to reach
the same result as that reached in the Saucier case. The comments to
that article indicate that if Attorney I has 'endered a "substantial part"
of the performance, then he would be owed the contracted fee, less
damages to Client*. for the part 'unperformed,, Which would be due to
82. La. Civ. 'Code aft. 1965 '(1870). See supra note:32.'




Attorney 2.11 If Attorney 1 has rendered "less than a substantial part
of the performance" before discharge, then he would be entitled to the
value of that performance to Client.86 Attorney 2 would be due the
remainder of the contracted contingency fee amount. It must be noted,
however, that Attorney l's services up to the point of discharge must
have been of some value to Client in order for him to recover under
article 2018.87 If it can be shown that Attorney l's services were of no
value to Client, then he apparently would be due no compensation.88
In the alternative, article 20549 might be applied. That article pro-
vides that
[wihen the parties made no provision for a particular situation,
it must be presumed that they intended to bind themselves ...
to whatever the law, equity, or usage regards as implied in a
contract of that kind or necessary to achieve its purpose.
The parties likely made no provision for paying Attorney 1 in the event
he should be discharged. If they did, that provision should control.9
In the absence of such a provision the court should assume that the
parties intended to bind themselves in an equitable manner, which the
court is then free to define. The courts should not feel restricted in the
use of article 2054; courts are accorded wide latitude in applying concepts
based on equity.
Any approach incorporating quantum meruit should be rejected. The
courts appear unable to apply the idea reasonably and consistently.
Indeed, the courts have been unable to agree even upon the general
approach that should be taken in applying the concept. Furthermore,
this jurisprudential import from the common law should be rejected
whenever the Civil Code supplies adequate direction, as it does in this
situation.
D. Substantial Performance
Like the cases discussed in the prior section, Farrar v. Kelly9' involved
a contingent fee contract and dismissal of the attorney by the client.
85. Id. comment (c). Although they are not positive law, these comments are persuasive
authority.
86. Id. comment (d).
87. Id. comment (e).
88. Id.
89. La. Civ. Code art. 2054. See also La. Civ. Code art. 4 and La. Civ. Code art.
21 (1870).
90. La. Civ. Code art. 2046. Such was the situation in Anderson, Hawsey & Rainach
v. Clean Land Air Water Corp., 489 So. 2d 928 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 492
So. 2d 1221 (1986). In that case, Client and Attorney I had agreed to a contract providing
for hourly rates should the contingency not be realized. Rejecting the attorney's claims
for quantum meruit after discharge, the court properly held that "the plaintiff law firm
was fully compensated under the terms of its contract." Id. at 930.
91. 440 So. 2d 939 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
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The contract provided that the attorney would receive a fee of 50% of
all money and property the client might receive from a succession. 92
Farrar, however, presents a new factual twist: the client dismissed the
attorney after a judgment was rendered but before recovery was made.
If the Farrar court had followed the "general rule" 93 of attorney
fee litigation in dismissal situations, it would have stated that an attorney-
client relationship is one of mandate and that the client may therefore
terminate the relationship at will. Since the client exercised that right
and discharged the attorney before occurrence of the contingency, the
compensation agreement was dissolved and unenforceable. Under that
line of jurisprudence, the attorney's proper basis of recovery would have
been quantum meruit.
The Farrar court, however, took another tack. The court stressed
the fact that the attorney had performed "substantially all of the services
contemplated by the contract." 94 The court concluded: "Having done
substantially all of the work contemplated by the contract, plaintiffs
are entitled to the full fee provided by the contract." 95 The court thus
enforced the contingency fee contract despite the fact that the suspensive
condition, the contingency, had not been fulfilled before discharge.
The result and reasoning of Farrar appear proper. Courts that face
similar situations in the future could, however, strengthen the Farrar
rationale by relying on article 201496 of the Civil Code, which provides:
A contract may not be dissolved when the obligor has rendered
a substantial part of the performance and the part not rendered
does not substantially impair the interest of the obligee. 97
Thus, since the attorney has rendered a substantial part of the per-
formance, the obligation of the client to pay the contingency fee should
not be dissolved.
In opposition to the application of article 2014, the client might
cite article 3028,98 which permits the client to revoke the mandate at
any time; thus, article 2014 may not prevent dissolution of the attorney-
client contract. A suitable response to that argument may be that just
because the mandate is revoked, the compensation agreement need not
be dissolved. Also, the attorney might rely alternatively on article 201.8, 99
92. Id. at 941.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37 and 68-73.
94. Farrar, 440 So. 2d at 941.
95. Id.
96. La. Civ. Code art. 2014.
97. Id. Supporting the application of this article is the notion that an attorney possesses
an interest in a contingent fee contract even before the occurrence of the contingency.
See Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977).
98. La. Civ. Code art. 3028.
99. La. Civ. Code art. 2018. See supra text accompanying notes 83-88.
1988]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
which could allow recovery for the attorney in this situation even in
the event that the entire attorney-client contract is dissolved.
Furthermore, article 2054'00 also provides a position that is much
more palatable to civilian analysis than is quantum meruit. Under article
2054, a court could reason that equity requires the court to assume a
provision providing compensation to an attorney who has performed
substantially everything necessary to fulfill the contingency.
III. THE ETHICAL LIMIT OF REASONABLENESS-WAVE OF THE FUTURE
OR PRESENT REALITY?
As was stated earlier, the Louisiana Supreme Court in the Saucier
case stated that the ethical rules regulating attorney practices have the
force and effect of substantive law. 10' Relying on that holding, the
supreme court in Leenert Farms, Inc. v. Rogers'0 2 expansively held that
"[a]lthough parties are permitted to contract with respect to attorney
fees .... attorney fees are subject to review and control by the courts."' 13
With these cases as a foundation, the courts have freely inquired into
the reasonableness of attorney fees as required by the ethical rules.1°4
This jurisprudential development bears serious implications for the
application of quantum meruit in attorney fee situations. Carried to its
extreme, this line of decisions could render moot the whole issue of
whether quantum meruit should apply in attorney fee cases as opposed
to the obligations and equity provisions of the Civil Code. All com-
pensation agreements between attorneys and clients would become worth-
less because of the overriding nature of the ethical rules' requirement
of reasonableness. Contract, quantum meruit, and codal equity would
become irrelevant.
Pharis & Pharis v. Rayner'05 foreshadows this extreme result. In
that case, the trial and appellate courts had found that a contingent
100. See also La. Civ. Code art. 4 and La. Civ. Code art. 21 (1870).
101. 373 So. 2d at 115.
102. 421 So. 2d 216 (La. 1982).
103. Id. at 218.
104. See, e.g., Richard v. Broussard, 482 So. 2d 729 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985), aff'd,
495 So. 2d 1291 (1986); Watson v. Cook, 427 So. 2d 1312 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983);
McCarthy v. Louisiana Timeshare Venture, 426 So. 2d 1342 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982),
writ denied, 433 So. 2d 163 (1983). Notably, the legislature has attempted to solidify
attorney fee agreements in written contracts. See La. Civ. Code art. 2000. The courts,
however, have refused to allow this legislation to override the mandate of reasonableness
from the ethical rules. See also Mengis, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Professional
Responsibility, 44 La. L. Rev. 489 (1983), discussing this jurisprudential development.
105. 397 So. 2d 1295 (La. 1981), on remand, 406 So. 2d 723 (App. 3d Cir. 1981).
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fee contract was void for lack of consent due to an error of fact.106
Justice Dennis, in a very short opinion, first stated that it was "un-
necessary to decide whether the contingent fee contract was valid in this
case."' 17 The court concluded: "Regardless of the validity of the em-
ployment contract, it is clear that the attorney rendered valuable services
for which he should be compensated but that the fee provided by the
contract would have been excessive and unreasonable under the circum-
stances."''0 The case was then remanded with instructions that the-lower
courts determine a reasonable fee in light of the ethical rules.
The Pharis case illustrates that the courts are 'considering the rea-
sonableness requirements of the ethical rules as the maximum limit of
attorney's fees. This requirement is not restricted to disciplinary pro-
ceedings. In adopting this position, however, the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Pharis seems to have skipped over a vital question: On what
basis was the attorney allowed to recover? °9 Contract? Quantum meruit?
Equity? The court cites only the ethical rules and Saucier as authority
for the attorney's recovery; the validity of the employment contract was
considered irrelevant. Has the court created a new cause of action for
the recovery of reasonable attorney fees under the ethical rules?
Whole papers could be written on the propriety of the supreme
court's extending ethical rules beyond the bounds of disciplinary pro-
ceedings and elevating them to the status of substantive law. One dif-
ficulty with this action is that it permits the courts to substitute their
own determinations regarding appropriate fees for those made by the
parties themselves, a practice that runs afoul of the codal principle of
autonomy of the will. Furthermore, serious separation of powers prob-
lems arise as a result of the elevation of judicially adopted rules over
those of the legislature, the traditional source of law in the civilian
scheme." 0 Arguably, application of the ethical rules should be limited
to disciplinary proceedings only.
Whatever the merits of this objection, it must be noted that the
standard of reasonableness dictated by the ethical rules calls for sub-
stantially the same analysis as that which is required by the courts in
106. Id. at 1296. Other courts have applied quantum meruit to allow the attorney to
recover in this situation. See, e.g., Succession of Butler, 294 So. 2d 512 (La. 1974); Liles
v. Bourgeois, 517 So. 2d 1078 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987). See Pharis, 397 So. 2d at 1296
(Marcus and Blanche, JJ., dissenting) (calling for recovery under quantum meruit).
107. Pharis, 397 So. 2d at 1296.
108. Id.
109. On remand, the third circuit set the attorney's fee using the factors of the ethical
rules, but stated that quantum meruit was the basis of recovery. Pharis & Pharis v.
Rayner, 406 So. 2d 723,. 726 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
110. In Saucier, the court stated that the ethical rules "override legislative acts which
tend to impede or frustrate" its authority to "regulate the practice of law." 373 So. 2d
at 115 (La. 1979) (on rehearing).
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figuring quantum meruit recovery. In fact, as was noted earlier, several
courts seem to be mixing the factors used for figuring quantum meruit
recovery with those for determining the ethical reasonableness of fees."'
In light of the considerations reviewed above, it seems that there
are at least four different ways in which the ethical rules' limit on
attorney fees may be incorporated into the determination of an attorney's
recovery. First, a court may follow the Pharis court's lead by basing
the attorney's recovery upon the rules of ethics alone. Second, a court
may award recovery on a quantum meruit basis, in which case no
further examination of the fee for ethical reasonableness would be
necessary-the tests for quantum meruit and reasonableness are virtually
identical. There are however other alternatives that are more in keeping
with civilian analysis. The court might award recovery pursuant to the
contract and the Civil Code's obligations articles, then examine the fee
further for ethical reasonableness in disciplinary proceedings if the point
is contested. Or the court could award recovery on the basis of the
Civil Code's equity provisions, obviating the need for further examination
of the fee for ethical reasonableness.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the courts of Louisiana have decided to apply the doctrine
of quantum meruit in attorney fee cases, their method of determining
recovery has been surprisingly consistent. The courts have examined
several aspects of the attorney's performance in an effort to determine
the reasonable fee for the attorney in each situation.
Nevertheless, the concept of quantum meruit should be discarded
by the Louisiana courts as inconsistent with civilian theory. Such common
law jurisprudential theories have no place in a civilian jurisdiction, at
least when the provisions of the Code supply adequate direction for
resolving the problem. Even if no express provision of the Civil Code's
obligations articles covers the situation, the codal equitable provisions
should always be used rather than quantum meruit.
Quantum meruit, however, does not present the only threat to
traditional analysis in this area. The Louisiana Supreme Court's elevation
of the judicially adopted ethical rules to a station above legislative
provisions arguably clashes with the notion of legislative superiority in
the enactment of laws. This judicial innovation should therefore likewise
be discarded.
111. See, e.g., Liles v. Bourgeois, 517 So. 2d 1078, 1082 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987);
Defrancesch v. Hardin, 510 So. 2d 42, 45 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 513 So. 2d
819 (1987); Fowler v. Jordan, 430 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Pharis & Pharis
v. Rayner, 406 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
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Obviously, the changes advocated in this paper would require a clean
break with prior decisions of the state's courts. It should be remembered,
however, that
the decisions of a court of last resort are not the law, but only
the evidence of what the court thinks is the law. Previous
statements even by this Court [the Louisiana Supreme Court]
cannot supersede what we now see is the plain letter and intent
of the statute.11 2
Armed with this idea, Louisiana courts should resist blind adherence to
erroneous jurisprudence and strive to maintain the Louisiana civil law
tradition.
H. David Vaughan, H
112. Construction Materials v. American Fidelity, 388 So. 2d 365, 367 (La. 1980)
(quoting Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., 178 La. 135, 145, 150 So. 855, 858
(1933)).
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